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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kentsler Lee Jones appeals from his conviction for felony operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, excessive alcohol concentration (.20 or 
more), following his conditional guilty plea to that offense. Jones specifically challenges 
the district court's decision granting the state's motion in limine to exclude evidence 
regarding the "measurement of uncertainty" for the instrument used to measure his 
blood alcohol concentration following a blood draw. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
According to the presentence report ("PSI"), the facts underlying Jones' 
conviction for felony driving under the influence of alcohol, excessive alcohol 
concentration (.20 or more), are as follows: 
The appended Boise Police Department Reports reflect that on October 5, 
2013, Officer Short observed a Pontiac driving the wrong way on Capitol 
near Main in Boise. Officer Short, who was walking in uniform, ordered 
the driver to stop. The driver, later identified as Kentsler Jones, made eye 
contact with Officer Short and drove around him without stopping. Officer 
Martinez was in the area and observed Mr. Jones' vehicle traveling south 
on Capital, approaching Front going against traffic. It turned west onto 
Front and Officer Martinez attempted to make a traffic stop. The vehicle 
continued south on 9th Street, east on Broad Street and then stopped in an 
alley between 9th Street and 8th Street. 
Upon contact with Mr. Jones, Officer Martinez could smell a strong odor of 
an alcohol beverage coming from his breath. He showed signs of 
intoxication by his slurred speech and bloodshot glassy eyes. Mr. Jones 
did not make sense when answering questions. When officers arrived to 
assist, Mr. Jones refused to perform any field sobriety tests, and he was 
placed into custody. He was not cooperative when officers tried to place 
him in the patrol car. Upon arrival at Ada County Jail, Mr. Jones acted like 
he was asleep and would not cooperate. Officers had to remove him from 
the backseat so paramedics could examine him. He was transported to 
St. Alphonsus for treatment, where a blood draw was completed. 
1 
The appended Forensic Volatiles Analysis Report shows an ethyl alcohol 
level of 0.207 g/100 cc blood. 
(PSI, p.3.) 
The state charged Jones with (1) operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol with "an alcohol concentration of .20 or more, to wit, .207, as shown 
by an analysis of his blood while having pied guilty to or having been found guilty of one 
or more violations of I.C. § 18-8004 ... in which the person has had an alcohol 
concentration of .20 or more within five years[,]" and (2) resisting or obstructing an 
officer. (R., pp.49-50.) 
The state filed a motion in limine requesting "the Court enter an order prohibiting 
any witness from offering testimony regarding the measurement of uncertainty(11 of the 
instrument used to measure the defendant's blood alcohol level [and] that the Court 
allow the state to strike any reference to the measurement of uncertainty from any 
exhibit which is admitted at trial[,]" based on Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep't of Transp., 153 
Idaho 200, 280 P.3d 703 (2012). (R., pp.73-76.) Jones, through counsel, filed an 
objection to the state's motion in limine (R., pp.89-94), and after both parties waived a 
hearing on the motion (R., p.95), the district court entered an order granting the state's 
motion in limine (R., pp.96-98). Jones filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling on 
the state's motion in limine (R., pp.103-109), and the state filed an objection to that 
motion (R., pp.195-198). At the pre-trial conference hearing, the court reaffirmed its 
opinion that, under Elias-Cruz, "evidence regarding the measurement of uncertainty for 
the instrument used to measure the defendant's blood alcohol level is inadmissible 
1 The measurement of uncertainty on the Forensic Volatiles Analysis Report of Jones' 
alcohol concentration is"+/-0.0103 g/100 cc blood[.]" (PSI, p.55 (sequential order).) 
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because it's irrelevant[,]" and denied Jones' motion to reconsider. (5/9/14 Tr., p.5, 22 
L.15.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jones entered a conditional guilty plea to Count I, 
felony operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an excessive alcohol 
concentration (.20 or more), preserving his right to challenge the district court's ruling on 
the state's motion in limine, and Count II (resisting/obstructing) was dismissed. (R., 
pp.202-206; see generally 8/15/14 Tr.) The court sentenced Jones to a unified 
sentence of five years with two years fixed, all suspended, and placed him on probation 
for five years. (R., pp.214-219.) Jones timely appealed. (R., pp.221-223.) 
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ISSUE 
Jones states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by excluding the measurement of uncertainty in 
Mr. Jones' alcohol concentration test results because I.C. § 18-8004 and 
I.C. § 18-8004C criminalize driving with an actual alcohol concentration 
above the legal limit, not merely driving with a test result above the legal 
limit? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Should this Court reject Jones' argument that Elias-Cruz should be overturned, 
and affirm the district court's ruling that the "measurement of uncertainty" of the 
instrument used to analyze Jones' alcohol concentration is irrelevant and, therefore, 
inadmissible at trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Reiect Jones' Argument That Elias-Cruz Should Be Overturned, And 
Affirm The District Court's Ruling That The "Measurement Of Uncertainty" Of The 
Instrument Used To Analyze Jones' Alcohol Concentration Is Irrelevant And, Therefore, 
Inadmissible At Trial 
A. Introduction 
Before the 1987 amendments to I.C. § 18-8004, the driving under the influence 
statute (former I.C. § 49-1102) stated in part, "If there was at that time more than O .10 
percent by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood,r21 it shall be presumed that the 
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 
280 P.3d at 706 (emphasis added). In Elias-Cruz, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
After the 1987 amendments, the standard is no longer the concentration of 
alcohol in the driver's blood. It is simply the alcohol concentration shown 
by an approved and properly administered test of the driver's breath, 
blood, or urine. Because the actual alcohol concentration in the driver's 
blood is no longer the standard, the testing machine's margin of error is 
irrelevant. 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709. Based on Elias-Cruz, the 
district court granted the state's motion in limine to preclude testimony about the 
2 The Elias-Cruz decision further explained: 
Prior to the 1987 amendment, subsection (4) of the statute stated: 
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for 
alcohol concentration is a determination of the percent by 
weight of alcohol in blood and shall be based upon a formula 
of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters 
of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-
seven (67) milliliters of urine. 
The 1987 amendment deleted the words stating that an evidentiary 
test for alcohol concentration "is a determination of the percent by weight 
of alcohol in blood." 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204, 280 P.3d at 704 (emphasis added). 
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measurement of uncertainty of the instrument (or means) used to measure Jones' 
alcohol concentration - here, analysis of his blood following a blood draw - and allow 
the state to strike any reference to the measurement of uncertainty from the I.S.P. 
forensic services report. (R., pp.73-76; 5/9/14 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.7, L.15.) 
On appeal, Jones contends Elias-Cruz should be overturned because it is 
manifestly wrong. Specifically, he argues Elias-Cruz (1) overlooked the plain language 
of I.C. § 18-8004(4) and misinterpreted its 1987 amendments as making the driver's 
actual alcohol concentration irrelevant, (2) "nullifies subsection (4)'s requirement that 
alcohol concentration tests comply with certain standard operating procedures, which, in 
turn require that alcohol concentration test results include the measurement of 
uncertainty[,]" and (3) relied on two cases, Sutliff and Robinett, 3 that do not support its 
conclusion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-19.) 
The district court correctly applied Elias-Cruz in granting the state's motion in 
limine to exclude testimony about the uncertainty measurement and to strike such 
measurement from the lab report on Jones' alcohol concentration as shown by an 
analysis of his blood. (R., pp.96-98; 5/9/14 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.7, L.15.) Jones has failed 
to demonstrate Elias-Cruz is manifestly wrong and should be overturned. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is 
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact supported by 
substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 
3 See State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), and State v. Robinett, 141 
Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2005). 
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(Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including whether the state has 
satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission of breath test results in a DUI 
prosecution, are subject to free review. State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P .2d 
225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied Elias-Cruz In Granting The State's Motion In 
Limine 
As apparently acknowledged by Jones, under Elias-Cruz, the margin of error or 
measurement of uncertainty associated with any of the three types of analyses for 
determining alcohol concentration (i.e., blood, breath, or urine) are irrelevant and 
inadmissible at trial. The Idaho Supreme Court made it clear in Elias-Cruz that the 
results of the particular type of test given are the relevant proof of a subject's alcohol 
concentration. The district court correctly granted the state's motion in limine, 
concluding, based on Elias-Cruz, that "evidence regarding the measurement of 
uncertainty for the instrument used to measure the defendant's blood alcohol level is 
inadmissible because it's irrelevant." (5/9/14 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.5). Review of the 
relevant law and Elias-Cruz supports the district court's ruling. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8004(1 )(a) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs 
and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, 
as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a 




The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the foregoing language "as 
establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation."4 State v. Robinett, 141 
Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005) (citations omitted). As applied to Jones' 
case, "the first way to prove a violation is to show under the totality of the evidence that 
the defendant was driving under the influence." kl "The second way to prove a 
violation is to establish the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of [0.20] 
percent or more." kl (explanation added). The second method is commonly referred to 
as the per se theory. See,~' State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 452, 313 P.3d 777, 780 
(Ct. App. 2013) ("In regard to a per se violation under section 18-8004(1 )(a), the 
criminal act is having an 'alcohol concentration of [0.20] ... or more, as shown by 
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath."') (explanation added). "The State may elect to 
proceed against the defendant under either or both theories of proof." Robinett, 141 
Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438. Further, "[e]vidence that is relevant under one theory of 
proof is not necessarily relevant under the other." kl (citations omitted). 
In this case, the state proceeded under the per se theory that Jones operated a 
motor vehicle "while under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration of .20 
4 Similar to 18-8004(1)(a), the enhancement statute, I.C. § 18-8004C(2), reads in 
relevant part: 
Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and who has an alcohol 
concentration of 0.20, as defined in section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or 
more, as shown by an analysis of his blood, breath or urine by a test 
requested by a police officer, and who previously has been found guilty of 
or has pied guilty to one (1) or more violations of the provisions of section 
18-8004, Idaho Code, in which the person had an alcohol concentration of 
0.20 or more ... shall be guilty of a felony .... 
(Emphasis added). 
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or more to wit, .207, as shown by an analysis of his blood" while having been convicted 
a similar offense within five years. (R., p.50.) Given the state's theory, the 
prosecutor moved in limine to exclude evidence that is not relevant to a per se 
allegation. (R., pp.73-76.) Specifically, the state moved to "exclude any evidence 
regarding the measurement of uncertainty for the instrument used to measure the 
defendant's blood alcohol level because that evidence would be irrelevant."5 (R., p.73.) 
In support of its motion, the state relied primarily on the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion 
in Elias-Cruz. (See R., pp.73-76.) 
"[E]vidence which is not relevant is inadmissible, and should be excluded if a 
proper objection is made." State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 134, 867 P.2d 1006, 
5 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services Analytical Methods for Volatiles Analysis 
explains "uncertainty of measurement," in relevant part, as follows: 
Any measurement, no matter how carefully obtained, should not be 
considered as the true value for the measurement. Whenever any 
quantitative measurement is performed, the value obtained is only an 
approximation of the true value. According to JCGM 200:2008, the 
International vocabulary of metrology - Basis and general concepts and 
associated terms (VIM), measurement uncertainty is defined as "A non-
negative parameter associated with the result of a measurement/quantity 
value (number and measurement unit used together to express the 
magnitude of a quantity) that characterizes the dispersion of quantity 
values that could reasonably be attributed to the measurand (quantity 
intended to be measured)." ... Paragraph 5.10.3.1 states that when 
applicable, the test report should include a statement on the estimated 
uncertainty of measurement. For our purposes, it is applicable due to the 
uncertainty affecting the application of the test results which are compliant 
to a specification limit. In the analysis of forensic specimens, we do not 
know the true value for the specimen; hence this information is not the 
error associated with the analysis. Rather, it is a range of values likely to 
be encountered during the measurement process. 
(R. p.116 (emphasis original; footnotes omitted).) 
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1008 (Ct. App. 1994 ). In Elias-Cruz, the Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim that 
a hearing officer in an administrative license suspension case violated the defendant's 
due process rights "by failing to take into account the margin of error of the Lifeloc 
FC20."6 Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 202-203, 280 P.3d at 705-706. In addressing this 
issue, the Court recited its prior holding in State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P .3d 
436 (2005), which was based on the 1984 version of I.C. § 18-8004, that where the 
state "seek[s] to establish a per se violation (the defendant's BAG exceeded the 
statutory limit), then it [is] not necessary to extrapolate the test results back to the time 
the defendant was driving." Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P.3d at 706. The Court 
then reviewed the 1987 amendments to I.C. § 18-8004, which eliminated the need for a 
"determination of alcohol concentration in the blood to prove a per se violation," and 
instead allowed the state to establish such a violation "simply by the test results." ~ at 
204, 280 P.3d at 707. Thus, the Court observed, "[a]fter the 1987 amendment, a 
violation can be shown simply by the results of a test for alcohol concentration that 
complies with the statutory requirements. With that change, the margin of error in the 
testing equipment is irrelevant." kl 
Addressing the legislature's authority to define crimes, the Court further stated: 
The legislature has the authority to make driving a motor vehicle with any 
alcohol in one's system a crime and/or a ground for suspension of one's 
driver's license. When the statute declared it a crime for a person to drive 
a motor vehicle with "alcohol in his blood" greater than a specified amount, 
we did not require the State to establish the precise amount of alcohol in 
the driver's blood at the time of driving, even though we knew that the 
alcohol concentration in the driver's blood at the time of the driving could 
6 Elias-Cruz had her driver's license suspended administratively under I.C. § 18-8002A 
after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to I.C. § 18-
8004(1 )(d) - under the age of 21 and driving with "an alcohol concentration of at least 
0.02 but less than 0.08 .... " Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 201, 280 P .3d at 704. 
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be lower than at the time of testing. In essence, we held that the driver 
took the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his blood at the time of 
testing would be greater than it was when he was actually driving an hour 
earlier. After the 1987 amendments, the standard is no longer the 
concentration of alcohol in the driver's blood. It is simply the alcohol 
concentration shown by an approved and properly administered test of the 
driver's breath, blood, or urine. Because the actual alcohol concentration 
in the driver's blood is no longer the standard, the testing machine's 
margin of error is irrelevant. 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709 (emphasis added). 
Elias-Cruz made clear that the margin of error is irrelevant to determining 
whether a defendant committed a per se violation of a driving under the influence 
statute as a result of the test performed to determine the alcohol concentration in his or 
her blood, breath, or urine.7 kl The Elias-Cruz decision, and cases preceding it, also 
7 Although Elias-Cruz involved an administrative license suspension following Elias-
Cruz's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(d) 
(under 21 with an alcohol concentration of at least 0.02 but less than 0.08), the Idaho 
Supreme Court's opinion applies to criminal cases relying on I.C. § 18-8004. In State v. 
Tomlinson, 2015 WL 1529416 (Idaho App. 2015) (pet. rev. pending), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals considered whether Elias-Cruz applies to criminal cases such as Tomlinson's, 
who was charged with driving under the influence after providing breath tests showing 
alcohol concentrations of .083 and .082. The Court of Appeals stated: 
After recounting the legislative history of I.C. § 18-8004, the Court 
noted that the definition of "evidentiary test for alcohol concentration" in 
Section 18-8002A is the same as the definition in Section 18-8004(4) and 
the margin of error of the testing equipment in proceedings was likewise 
irrelevant to proceedings under I.C. § 18-8002A. Thus, contrary to 
Tomlinson's assertion, Elias-Cruz is not limited to only administrative 
proceedings; instead, it interpreted the criminal statute under which 
Tomlinson was prosecuted and applied that interpretation to the 
administrative proceedings. The context of the Court's interpretation of a 
criminal statute does not change the applicability of that interpretation. 
Indeed, what is relevant to proving a violation of I.C. § 18-8004 is the 
same regardless of the context. As a result, that interpretation is just as 
controlling as to the admissibility of the margin of error of a breathalyzer in 
a criminal case as it is in an administrative setting. 
Tomlinson, 2015 WL 1528416 at *7 (pet. rev. pending) (citations omitted). 
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made clear that the relevant question under a per se theory of driving under the 
influence is the result of the particular alcohol concentration test at the time the test is 
given, not when the defendant was driving. 1st Based on Elias-Cruz, the district court 
granted the state's motion in limine, correctly concluding that "evidence regarding the 
measurement of uncertainty for the instrument used to measure the defendant's blood 
alcohol level is inadmissible because it's irrelevant." (5/9/14 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.5). 
D. Jones Has Failed To Show The Elias-Cruz Decision Is Manifestly Unjust And 
Should Be Overturned 
Jones does not dispute that, under Elias-Cruz, the district court's ruling was 
correct. Instead, Jones argues that Elias-Cruz should be overturned. (See generally 
Appellant's Brief.) This Court should reject Jones' invitation to overrule Elias-Cruz. 
"The rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow controlling precedent unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 789, 331 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 
2014) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted). None of the arguments advanced 
by Jones support overturning Elias-Cruz. 
1. The Plain Language And 1987 Amendment Of I.C. § 18-8004(4) And The 
Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-8004C(2) Support The Holding In Elias-Cruz 
Jones argues that "Subsection (4) [of I.C. § 18-8004] never states or even 
implies that only the test result, and not the driver's actual alcohol concentration, 
matters." (Appellant's Brief, p.12 (emphasis added).) Jones also contends that the 
1987 amendments to I.C. § 18-8004(4) "do not indicate, as Elias-Cruz found, that the 
12 
Legislature intended to make the driver's actual alcohol concentration irrelevant." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 (capitalization and underlining omitted).) Jones' arguments do 
not have merit. 
Jones cites two sections of I.C. § 18-8004 which require "an alcohol 
concentration" of either .08 (sut?section (1 )(a)) or .20 (subsection C(2)) "as shown by 
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath ... " (Appellant's Brief, p.12 (emphasis added).) 
Without explanation, Jones repeatedly adds the word "actual" to create the phrase 
"actual alcohol concentration," which seems to denote actual or true blood alcohol 
concentration. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10-15.) Jones argues that the statutory 
"sections specifically criminalize driving with an actual alcohol concentration, which the 
test result merely evidences." (Appellant's Brief, p.12 (emphasis added).) However, the 
word "actual" does not appear in the relevant statutes. See I.C. §§ 18-8004(4)8 and 18-
8004C(2). Jones' rephrasing of the statutory language is simply not accurate. 
8 Idaho Code§ 18-8004(4) reads: 
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration shall be based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one 
hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters 
of breath or sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or 
breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration shall be 
performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a 
laboratory approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of 
approval and certification standards to be set by that department, or by 
any other method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for 
alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or 
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by 
the Idaho state police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state 
without the necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of 
the testing procedure for examination. 
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Next, Jones concedes that the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 18-8004(4) "shows that 
legislature intended to remove the requirement that measurements of alcohol in 
breath or urine be converted into measurements of alcohol in blood[.]" (Appellant's 
Brief, p.14.) Despite that acknowledgment, Jones contends the statute kept "the 
requirement that the driver have an alcohol concentration over a certain amount in his 
or her body." (Id. (emphasis original).) In addition to pointing out that neither I.C. § 18-
8004(4) nor I.C. § 18-8004C(2) makes any r:r,ention of "body," the state is uncertain 
what Jones means by "body." If "body" is intended to mean the actual or true alcohol 
concentration in a subject's blood, that notion has been dispelled by the 1987 
amendment - as Jones admits by agreeing that conversion from one test into 
"measurements of alcohol in blood" is no longer required. (See id.) If, on the other 
hand, "body" refers to "breath, blood, or urine," the only measurements of alcohol 
concentration possible are the test results produced by whatever type of analysis is 
performed.9 If there is some other measurement of alcohol concentration that is 
relevant, Jones has failed to identify it. 
Most importantly, the plain language of I.C. § 18-8004(4), combined with the 
plain language of I.C. § 18-8004C(2), shows that "alcohol concentration" refers only to 
9 In regard to the relevance of a testing machine's margin of error under the license 
suspension statute, but applicable here (seen. 7, supra), Elias-Cruz explained: 
The issue is not the alcohol concentration in the blood. It is the alcohol 
concentration as shown by the test results. There is nothing to which to 
compare the test results. All that is required is that the test results show 
that the alcohol concentration was above the legal limit. 
153 Idaho at 206, 280 P.3d at 709 (emphasis added). Because the 1987 amendment of 
I.C. § 18-8004(4) removed the requirement that the test results correlate to the actual or 
true alcohol concentration of blood, "[a]II that is required is that the test results show that 
the alcohol concentration was above the legal limit." kl 
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the results of the particular test performed. Therefore, margin of error and 
measurement of uncertainty are irrelevant. I.C. § 18-8004(4) states that "an evidentiary 
test for alcohol concentration shall be based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one 
hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or 
sixty-seven(67) milliliters of urine." I.C. § 18-8004(4) (emphasis added). Thus, there 
are three evidentiary tests for "alcohol concentration" - blood, breath, or urine. Under 
I.C. § 18-8004C(2), any person "who has an alcohol concentration of .20 ... or more, 
as shown by an analysis of his blood, breath or urine" is guilty of a felony upon a second 
such offense within five years. See Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708 ("It is 
simply the alcohol concentration shown by an approved and properly administered test 
of the driver's breath, blood, or urine."). It could not be more plain. 
Moreover, as Elias-Cruz discussed, in 1987 the Idaho Legislature deleted 
language from I.C. § 18-8004(4) that an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration "is a 
determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the blood." Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 
204, 280 P.3d at 707. The obvious import of that change is that an evidentiary test for 
alcohol concentration is no longer "a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in 
the blood." kL see Hawkins v. Chandler, 88 Idaho 20, 30, 396 P.2d 123, 128 (1964) 
("When the language of a statute is changed, it is presumed a change in application or 
meaning was intended."). Here, Jones essentially asks this Court to re-insert the 
phrase deleted by the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 18-8004(4) -- "is a determination of the 
percent by weight of alcohol in blood" - in order to use the margin of error or 
measurement of uncertainty and avoid the felony enhancement. See United States v. 
Handy, 761 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting a statutory construction that 
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"would have us give the phrase ... precisely the meaning the phrase would have if the 
[at issue] were deleted"). 
Based on the plain language of LC. § 18-8004(4) and its 1987 amendments, 
Elias-Cruz concluded: 
After the 1987 amendments, the standard is no longer the 
concentration of alcohol in the driver's blood. It is simply the alcohol 
concentration shown by an approved and properly administered test of the 
driver's breath, blood, or urine. Because the actual alcohol concentration 
in the driver's blood is no longer the standard, the testing machine's 
margin of error is irrelevant. 
Elias Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709. 
Both the plain language of the statutes (1.C. §§ 18-8004(4) and 18-8004C(2)) and 
the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 18-8004(4) show that "alcohol concentration" is 
determined by the test results of whichever one of the three designated types of tests is 
used - without accounting for margin of error or measurement of uncertainty. Jones 
has failed to show that the Idaho Supreme Court erred in Elias-Cruz by overlooking the 
plain, unambiguous language of the relevant statutes and has therefore failed to show 
Elias-Cruz should be overruled on that basis. 
2. Jones Has Failed To Show That Elias-Cruz Has Had The Practical Effect 
Of Nullifying Parts Of I.C. § 18-8004(4) 
Jones argues that, because the Standard Operating Procedures for determining 
alcohol concentration by blood analysis requires inclusion of the measurement of 
uncertainty on the lab report (see R., p.116 (defining "measurement uncertainty")), and 
because I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires that tests for alcohol concentration adhere to those 
procedures, 
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[i]t would be nonsensical for Subsection (4) to require that the alcohol 
concentration test reports include the measurement of uncertainty, but at 
the same time declare the measurement of uncertainty irrelevant and 
therefore inadmissible in court. Elias-Cruz's reading of Subsection (4) has 
done just that. Because Elias-Cruz has had the practical effect of 
nullifying parts of Subsection (4), it must be overturned. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Jones' argument is misplaced. 
Contrary to Jones' contention, it was the Idaho Legislature, not the Idaho 
Supreme Court, which rendered the margin of error and measurement of uncertainty 
irrelevant and inadmissible in court. By its 1987 amendments to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the 
legislature deleted any requirement that the results of the particular type of test 
performed (blood, breath, or urine) be correlated to a subject's actual or true blood 
alcohol concentration. As a result, margin of error and measurement of uncertainty are 
irrelevant and inadmissible at trial. As discussed, the Elias-Cruz decision recognized 
that fact and applied it in a driver's license suspension proceeding that involved 1.C. § 
18-8004(4). Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709. 
Even though the Standard Operating Procedures ("Idaho State Police Forensic 
Services Analytical Methods for Volatiles Analysis," see R., pp.116-121) were, arguably, 
not modified to reflect the 1987 legislative amendments to I.C. § 18-8004(4 ), it does not 
lead to the conclusion Jones proposes - that Elias-Cruz must be overturned "[b]ecause 
[it] has had the practical effect of nullifying parts of Subsection (4)[.]" (Appellant's Brief, 
p.17.) The only nullification of I.C. § 18-8004(4) was done by the Idaho Legislature in 
1987 by deleting the phrase "is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in 
blood." Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204, 280 P.3d at 707. Because the legislature 
removed the thing "to which to compare the test results," the legislature also made "the 
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alcohol concentration as shown by the test results" the issue to be determined. Elias-
153 Idaho at 206, 280 P.3d at 709. 
Additionally, because the measurement of uncertainty was typewritten on Jones' 
lab report, the Standard Operating Procedures were, in fact, followed. (See PSI, p.55 
(sequential).) Jones has not shown that the Standard Operating Procedures or I.C. § 
18-8004(4) required more than that. Although l.C. § 18-8004(4) states, in part, that 
such information "shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the 
necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination[,]" that provision does not require the admission of irrelevant evidence at 
trial. Rather, the statute allows certain (presumably relevant) evidence to be admitted 
for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the testing procedure without a witness. 
A defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence. State v. Meister, 148 
Idaho 236, 241, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2009). The measurement of uncertainty is 
irrelevant to Jones' case not only for the reasons previously stated, but also because, 
under I.C. § 18-8004(4), it could not have established the reliability of the testing 
procedure. (See R., p.116 (I.S.P. Forensic Services, Analytical Methods for Volatiles 
Analysis (i.e., Standard Operating Procedures) states, "[H]ence this information is not 
the error associated with the analysis. Rather, it is a range of values likely to be 
encountered during the measurement process."); see also I.C. § 18-8004(4); Elias-Cruz, 
153 Idaho at 206, 280 P.3d at 709 ("There is nothing to which to compare the test 
results."). Inasmuch as the measurement of uncertainty would not have had any 
relevance to the reliability of the testing procedure used in Jones' case, he has failed to 
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show that I.C. § 18-8004(4) has in any way been nullified by the "practical effect" of 
Elias-Cruz. 
3. Jones Has Failed To Show That Elias-Cruz Misread Robinett And Sutliff10 
Jones contends that in Elias-Cruz, the Idaho Supreme Court misread the Sutliff 
and Robinett decisions when it stated, "In essence, we held that the driver took the risk 
that the concentration of alcohol in his blood at the time of testing would be greater than 
it was when he was actually driving an hour earlier." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (quoting 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708) (emphasis added).) Jones argues that 
the "took the risk" comment in Elias-Cruz shows the Court incorrectly cited Sutliff and 
Robinett for the notion that, in per se DUI cases, defendants are not permitted to 
present any extrapolation evidence. 11 (See Appellant's Brief, pp.17-19.) Jones' 
argument fails. 
10 See State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523,547 P.2d 1128 (1976), and State v. Robinett, 141 
Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2005). 
11 The relevant passage from Elias-Cruz bears repeating here: 
When the statute declared it a crime for a person to drive a motor vehicle 
with "alcohol in his blood" ... , we did not require the State to establish the 
precise amount of alcohol in the driver's blood at the time of driving, even 
though we knew that the alcohol concentration in the driver's blood at the 
time of the driving could be lower than at the time of testing. In essence, 
we held that the driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his 
blood at the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was 
actually driving an hour earlier. After the 1987 amendments, the standard 
is no longer the concentration of alcohol in the driver's blood. It is simply 
the alcohol concentration shown by an approved and properly 
administered test of the driver's breath, blood, or urine. Because the 
actual alcohol concentration in the driver's blood is no longer the standard, 
the testing machine's mar,gin of error is irrelevant. 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708. 
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Jones correctly states that Sutliff and Robinett recognized that in per se DUI 
cases (prior to the 1987 legislative abolition of the "blood alcohol" standard), "a driver 
may affirmatively challenge [BAC] results by showing that his alcohol concentration was 
below the lawful limit when he actually drove." (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) However, 
Jones' assertion that Elias-Cruz stated otherwise is not accurate. 
First and foremost, Elias-Cruz quoted the portions of Sutliff and Robinett which 
clearly state that, although extrapolation evidence was not a prerequisite for admission 
of a SAC test result in a per se case, it was relevant to challenge the weight to be given 
such result by showing that the BAC content was different when driving. The Elias-Cruz 
court simply recognized that, at one point in the historical development of Idaho's DUI 
laws, extrapolation evidence was admissible to challenge the weight of a SAC test 
result, as follows: 
In Robinett, we held that "[u]nlike proceeding on a per se theory, 
admission of a numerical SAC [blood alcohol concentration] test result for 
purposes of demonstrating impairment must be extrapolated back to the 
time of the alleged offense to be relevant." Id. at 113, 106 P.3d at 439. If 
the prosecution was simply seeking to establish a per se violation (the 
defendant's SAC exceeded the statutory limit), then it was not necessary 
to extrapolate the test results back to the time the defendant was driving. 
We stated: 
Where the prosecution elects to use the per se method, the 
question is what the alcohol level was at the time the sample 
was taken. "The lapse of time prior to the extraction of 
samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results 
and not to their admissibility." For that reason, it is 
appropriate to admit results drawn an hour or more after the 
alleged offense without having to actually extrapolate the 
evidence back to the time of the alleged offense. Id. 
(quoting State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 523, 524, 547 P.2d 
1128, 1129 (1976)). 
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203-204, 289 P.3d at 706-707 (emphasis added). 
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The above statement from Elias-Cruz (quoting, in turn, Robinett and Sutliff), that 
"[t]he lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded 
the test results and not to their admissibility," id., reiterates Sutliffs and Robinett's 
understanding that although the state was not12 required to present extrapolation 
evidence in order to admit a BAC test result in a per se case, a defendant could offer 
extrapolation evidence to challenge the weight of the result. Jones' assertion that Elias-
Cruz misread Sutliff and Robinett on this point is incorrect. Compare Elias-Cruz, 153 
Idaho at 203-204, 280 P.3d at 706-707 with Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 524-525, 547 P.2d at 
1129-1130 and Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112-113, 106 P.3d at 438-439. 
Nor did Elias-Cruz's "took the risk" comment indicate that Sutliff and Robinett 
stood for the idea that DUI defendants could not present extrapolation evidence. Elias-
Cruz discussed Sutliff and Robinett within the context of reviewing the historical 
development of Idaho's DUI laws, a brief summary of which follows: 
Sutliff was decided before the law was changed in 1984 to create a "per se" 
violation of the DUI statute based on evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration, and 
before the 1987 statutory amendment eliminated the need to correlate the test results to 
"a determination of alcohol concentration in the blood to prove a per se violation." Elias-
Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203-204, 280 P.3d at 706-707. Prior to the 1984 changes in the DUI 
law (repealing the statutory presumptions and creating I.C. § 18-8004), an evidentiary 
test for alcohol concentration of over .08 percent was used as a rebuttable presumption 
12 Robinett, decided in 2005, was recalling the period of time before the 1987 legislative 
abolishment of the "blood alcohol" standard in DUI cases, but Sutliff was decided during 
the time that standard was in effect. See Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112-113, 106 P.3d at 
438-439; Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 524-525, 547 P.2d at 1129-1130. 
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that a defendant was "under the influence of intoxicating beverages."13 Sutliff, 97 Idaho 
at 525 n.3, 547 P.2d at 1130 n.3; see Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P.3d at 706. 
As a result, when Sutliff was decided in 1976, a defendant could present extrapolation 
testimony to challenge the weight to be given the state's BAC test results and rebut the 
statutory presumption applicable to defendants with BACs of more than 0.08 percent 
"that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages." .[Q,_; see Elias-
Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P .3d at 706. 
In Robinett, decided in 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held "that a 
numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for driving under the influence (as 
opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation is laid to assure the validity of 
the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result back to the time of the alleged 
offense." Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438; see Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 
203, 280 P.3d at 706. In contrasting "per se" cases to "impairment" cases, Robinett 
quoted Sutliff's comment that, in a per se case, "[t]he lapse of time prior to the extraction 
of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results and not to their 
admissibility." Robinett, 141 Idaho at 113, 106 P.3d at 439 (quoting Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 
524, 547 P.2d at 1129); see Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P.3d at 706. 
In considering Sutliff and Robinett in the context of the historical development of 
Idaho DUI law, Elias-Cruz explained that, during the time it was a crime for a person to 
drive a motor vehicle with "alcohol in his blood" greater than the legal amount (i.e., prior 
to the 1987 change in law), it held, "[i]n essence that the driver took the risk that the 
13 Elias-Cruz explained that under the new 1984 law, "the test results no longer created 
merely a presumption of intoxication. They could be used to establish a per se violation 
of the statute[,]" which initially adopted a 0.10 percent BAC standard, but was amended 
to a 0.08 standard in 1997. Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203 n.2, 280 P.3d at 706 n.2. 
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concentration of alcohol in his blood at the time of testing would be greater than it was 
when he was actually driving an hour earlier." Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 
708. Based on its reiteration of Sutliff's and Robinett's statements that "'[t]he lapse of 
time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results 
and not to their admissibility[,]'" and the existing DUI law prior to the 1984 and 1987 
changes, the "risk" to defendants Elias-Cruz referred to was that BAG test results would 
be admissible at trial without the state first having to present extrapolation evidence of 
what the driver's BAG was at the time of driving -- even assuming extrapolation 
evidence would show a result under the legal limit. Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 
P.3d at 706 (quoting Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 524, 547 P.2d at 1129) (emphasis added). 
Stated differently, given Elias-Cruz's understanding that Sutliff and Robinett recognized 
that, during the "blood alcohol" era, defendants in per se DUI cases could challenge the 
weight of a BAG test result with extrapolation evidence, Elias-Cruz's "took the risk" 
comment could only have meant that a per se DUI defendant took the risk that a BAG 
test result would be admitted at trial even if extrapolation evidence could show the BAG 
was lower at the time of driving. 
In short, Jones has failed to show that Elias-Cruz misread Sutliff and Robinett, 
much less that it is "manifestly wrong," "has proven over time to be unjust or unwise," or 
that "overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued unjustice." Clontz, 156 Idaho at 789, 331 P.3d at 531. The district court's 
order that relied on Elias-Cruz as the basis to grant the state's motion in limine to 
exclude evidence reqarding the uncertainty measurement should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision 
granting the state's motion in limine, and affirm Jones' judgment of conviction and 
sentence. 
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